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RECENT DECISION
to be released on a writ of habeas corpus. The majority of the court
said that the plaintiff having been duly convicted may not subsequently
be released by a writ of habeas corpus, based on some judicial error
which might have been cured by a writ of error.15
Facts, and their consideration is the main difference between the
two writs. That is, coram nobis has to take into consideration fraud,
duress, negligence and much more in determining whether or not the
prisoner deserves a new hearing. And in habeas corpus the only thing
to be considered is whether or not the process of putting the person
in prison consisted of due process with no regard to the pertinent facts
brought out.
After the consideration of the foregoing cases it may be concluded
that habeas corpus can never replace or take the position of coram
nobis. The former is a ground for a new trial, the latter is merely
a test to see whether or not the man had any of his rights violated in
the first trial.
Daniel D. Dahill.
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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. - TODAY. - Respondent is a handler of
milk in Chicago area which milk it purchases from producers in Illinois.
The respondent has been charged with non-compliance of order 41 of
the Secretary of Agriculture prescribed under the Agriculture Marketing Agreement.' The respondent answers by alleging that his business
is solely in intrastate commerce and that in consequence the statute
does not and cannot under the commerce clause, apply to him. The
question before the court was whether certain price regulations by
Secretary of Agriculture of milk produced and sold intrastate is authorized by the Agriculture Marketing Act and whether it is permissible under the commerce clause. The Supreme Court found that the
respondent's intrastate activities were in competition with interstate
milk dealers and as such the respondent was subject to regulation by
the Federal Government under the commerce clause. The court makes
some interesting observations, in the opinion, in regard to the circumstances under which Congress may regulate commerce under the commerce clause. The court says, "the commerce power is not confined
in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce,
or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regula15

In re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 17 S. Ct. 638 (1805).

1 50 Stat. 246, 7 U. S. C. A. § 608 c (1937).
0
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tion of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." "It is the effect upon interstate commerce or upon the exercise of the power to regulate it, not the source of the injury which
is the criterion of Congressional power." 2 The Supreme Court also
refutes the parallel pointed out by the lower court between the principal case and the Schechter case, saying that in the Scheckter case
the defendants were not charged with injury to interstate commerce
or interference with persons engaged in that commerce. The court
goes on to say that in the principal case the defendant's intrastate activities create a direct burden on interstate commerce which is subject
to Congressional regulation under the commerce clause.
The principal case represents the present policy of the. Supreme
Court of the United States to extend the power of regulation of local
business by Congress. This extension has been accomplished thru the
aid of the Supreme Court in gradually widening the scope of things
subject to regulation under the guise of the commerce clause. 8 It is
not the purpose of this comment to uphold or to criticize this recent
trend, but rather to point to the legal evolution by which this centralization of power has been effected.
It seems rather obvious that those who framed and adopted the
Constitution of the United States intended that the Constitution should
provide for a separation of the national and state governments. Certain legislative powers, possessed by the states, were delegated or
granted to the national government by the Constitution. As a result
a dual government was established, the federal government having
those powers specifically delegated, and all other legislative powers remaining in the states. This is an elementary principal of Constitutional Law, and yet it is the basis used in the construction of our Constitution to ascertain the powers of the federal government. Fortunately or unfortunately, as the case may be, the elasticity of our
Federal Constitution has afforded an opportunity for the Supreme
Court of the United States to construe the Constitution so as to increase the powers of the federal government. The most recent and
striking example of this principle is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing the commerce clause.4
The Constitution of the United States gave Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce, 5 but it became the task of the Supreme
U. S. -v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 62 S. Ct. 523 (1942).
3 Constitution of U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3.
4 Constitution of U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 3.
See: U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); U. S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 62 S.Ct. 523
(1942); N. L. R. B. v. Jones and McLaughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S.1, 81 L. ed. 893,
57 S.Ct. 615 (1937); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. 8.
453, 82 L. ed. 954, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
5 Constitution of U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 8, C1. 3.
2
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Court to say what was "commerce" and what was "interstate." The
early case of Gibbons v. Ogden 6 says, "Commerce is traffic, but it is
something more, it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nation, in all its branches, and
is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." A
later case points out that interstate commerce does not embody that
commerce which is "completely internal which is carried on between
man and man, in a state, or between different parts, of the same state,
and which does not extend to or affect other states." 7 Early decisions
were quick to point out that businesses and things purely local in
character were not subject to Congressional regulation under the commerce clause. Applying this test child labor within a state was held
not a subject for regulation by Congress; 8 as was mining; 9 production of gas, 10 oil," electric current; 12 baseball clubs, 13 vaudeville
circuits 14 and local business. 15 In support of the above decisions the
courts have pointed to the apparent intent of the framers of the United
States Constitution to create a dual government, and the decisions restricted any transgression, by the federal government, on states rights.
This principal is illustrated in the case of Texas v. White when the
court says, "Not only therefore can there be no loss of separate and
independent autonomy to the states through their union under the
Constitution, but it may not be unreasonably said that the preservation of the states, and the maintenance of their governments, are as
much within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of National government." 16
In the recent Bituminous Coal Case 17 this basic theory of duality
was reiterated, "The States were before the Constitution; and, consequently, their legislative powers antedated the Constitution. Those
6

9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 1 (1824).
Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 436, 28 S. Ct. 27 (1908).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918);
overruled in U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
9 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 S. Ct.
7
8

526 (1923).
10 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 71 L. ed. 1049, 47 S. Ct.
639 (1927).
11 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Com., 286 U. S. 210, 76 L. ed. 1062, 52

S. Ct. 559 (1932).
12 Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 76 L. ed. 1038, 52 S. Ct.
548 (1932).

13 Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat. League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 259 U. S. 200, 66 L. ed. 898, 42 S. Ct. 465 (1922).

14 Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Excbg., 12 F. 2d 341 (1926).

15 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. ed. 1160, 56 S Ct. 855
(1936).
1D 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. ed. 227 (1869).
17 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. ed. 1160, 56 S. Ct. 855

(1936).
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who framed and those who adopted the instrument meant to carve
from the general mass of legislative powers, then possessed by the
states, only such portions as it was thought wise to confer upon the
federal government; and in order that there should be no uncertainty
in respect of what was taken and what was left, the national powers
of legislation were not aggregated but enumerated - with the result
that what was not embraced by the enumeration remained vested in
the states without change or impairment. . . And adherence to that
determination is incumbent equally upon the federal government and
the states."
With the growth of the United States coupled with ever growing
business and the development of modern communication and transportation facilities, there was a growing demand for greater national
regulation, and control.' 8 As a result, the Supreme Court has sustained the right of Congress to regulate interstate commerce when the
thing regulated is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, 19 when
the thing regulated directly affects the flow of goods in interstate commerce,2210 and where intrastate commerce interferes with interstate commerce.
Recently, the courts have approved the right of Congress to regulate
to protect interstate commerce. This new doctrine first found favor in
the National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and McLaughlin Steet
22
In this case the defendant corporation was charged
Corporation.
with unfair labor practices which were purely local in character. Nevertheless the Supreme Court found that since this local labor unrest
might affect interstate commerce the federal government could regulate the defendant corporation's activities to insure protection of interstate commerce. Again, in the case of the Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Company v. National Labor Relations Board 23 the court held that
the National Labor Relations Act applied to the Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Company though less than 30 per cent of the company's business was in interstate commerce.
Although these cases served to introduce the extension of the commerce clause, it remained for the Darby Case 24 to open the door to
complete regulation by Congress of any business or thing which affects
interstate commerce. It was the Darby Case which upheld the validity
18 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Business, § 23 (1939).
1.
Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288, 80 L. ed. 688, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936).
20

Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. ed. 518, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1905)

Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. ed. 735, 42 S. Ct. 397 (1922).
21
Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed.
1341, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914).
22 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
23 303 U. S. 453, 82 L. ed. 954, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
24 U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
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of the Fair Labor Standards Act under the commerce clause. The
court held that Congress could regulate to protect interstate commerce
by regulating those things which affect interstate connnerce; the court
saying, "The motive and purpose of the present regulation is plainly
to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that
interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor
conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce and to the
states from and to which the commerce flows. The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no
restriction and over which the courts are given no control . . . whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power
conferred on Congress by the commerce clause." 25
In accord with the principles set forth in the Darby Case,26 the
principal case of United States v. Wrigktwood Dairy Company 27 seems
to go a step further when the court holds that a local business which
is in competition with a business engaged in interstate commerce is
subject to regulation by Congress under the commerce clause. In the
opinion the court says," ... the marketing of a local product in competition with that of a like commodity moving interstate may so interfere with interstate commerce or its regulation as to afford a basis for
Congressional regulation of the intrastate activity."
From a review of these recent decisions, it at once becomes apparent
that the power of the federal government to regulate local affairs and
businesses is potentially plenary.. To illustrate this point it seems pertinent to say that the farmer who sells his potatoes from door to door
is in competition with the grocery that sells potatoes which have been
shipped in interstate commerce. Although it may seem absurd to
suppose that the federal government would regulate a house to house
vendor, yet the fact remains that it is within the power of Congress
to effectuate such regulation under the present decisions of the Supreme Court if the court determines that such a vendor interfers with
interstate commerce. If such regulation was carried into effect, it
would mean that our dual system of government would be destroyed
for all practical purposes. Thus, it would be possible, by construction
of our Constitution of the United States to change our dual government into a centralized government with all essential control within
the federal government. Although, at first blush, this seems very im25
26

27

U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
62 S. Ct. 523 (1942).

